Research & Policy Papers

Political Parallelism and Public Trust in Maldivian Media

How political bias shapes the Maldivian media landscape, and what it does to public perception, credibility and trust.

2025-06-01

How does political parallelism shape the media landscape, and how does political bias influence public perception, media credibility, and trust in media in the Maldives?

Introduction

With a dynamic and shifting media system, the rise of political parallelism, and increasing public distrust in the media, the Maldivian media landscape has been tasked with navigating the complexities of a developing democracy that has rapidly evolved through the digital revolution driven by the expansion of Web 2.0.

While the digital revolution empowered journalists and opened up new channels for public discussion with increased accessibility, the lack of laws to regulate these digital media spaces has allowed misinformation, hate speech, and misleading or abusive content to flourish. The widespread presence of ‘partisan polyvalence’ continues to blur the boundaries between journalism, misinformation, and propaganda as political actors keep exploiting media for their own gains, resulting in a society that is polarised and distrustful of the media.

Theoretical Framework

In the Maldivian context, Hallin and Mancini’s media systems theory offers a foundational framework for analyzing how political parallelism influences media systems. The theory is especially helpful for understanding the media as a hybrid system, borrowing characteristics from both Polarized Pluralist and Liberal models due to its post-authoritarian democratization and recent digital transformation. Political parallelism is particularly prominent in the Maldives, given the complex and dynamic nature of the media landscape, where multiple media coexist with different principles; the media system is not a single ‘system’ but consists of many overlapping and sometimes inconsistent elements from various ‘model systems’ (Hallin & Mancini, 2004, p. 12; Jakubowicz, 2010, p. 9). Hallin & Mancini (2011) emphasise that countries with recent democratic transitions tend to have greater ideological diversity, significant state involvement in economic and social development, and the mixing of journalism with politics and literature through clientelism (p. 280).

Additionally, Van der Pas, van der Brug, and Vliegenthart (2017) examine the bidirectional influence between newspapers and political parties in the Netherlands through time-series analysis, which reveals that political parallelism significantly shapes agenda-setting, with media and political actors mutually influencing each other's priorities. In the Maldives, where media outlets often align with political factions, this research highlights the importance of scrutinising media-party relationships to understand agenda-setting processes. The findings suggest that political parallelism can influence content even in professional media environments, implying that such effects might be even more pronounced in less regulated contexts like the Maldives.

Lee, Lin, and Chen’s (2024) investigation into how political parallelism influences journalistic roles in Taiwan, South Korea, and Japan finds that varying degrees of political parallelism correspond to differences in journalistic practices, with higher parallelism leading to more advocacy-oriented journalism. The study highlights the adaptability of journalistic roles in response to political contexts. For the Maldives, this research underscores the need to assess how the political affiliations of media outlets shape journalistic behaviour and content. Understanding these dynamics can inform strategies to promote journalistic independence and credibility.

Hallin & Mancini (2011) claim that in Asian countries, the ‘partisan polyvalence’ is more common where journalists have ties to specific politicians, making it easier to adapt to changing political loyalties (p. 293). Political parties in developing democracies like the Maldives are often shallow and short-lived, lacking clear ideological roots. As a result, most political activity in these countries focuses on specific individuals rather than parties, as presidentialism encourages personalised politics over party politics (Hallin & Mancini, 2011, p. 294). Media outlets funded by politicians and businesses have turned to social media platforms such as X, criticising traditional news media as untrustworthy, capable of manipulation and producing misinformation and ‘fake’ news, while also promoting populist agendas aligned with influential politicians (IFJ, 2023).

Methodology

To address the research question, a mixed-methods approach combining textual and discourse analysis, interviews, and surveys is particularly prevalent for this topic. We examine the impact of political parallelism and bias on public trust in the media.

Surveys

Surveys targeting media consumers will offer valuable insights into how the public perceives political bias and how it impacts trust in different outlets. Surveys can assess audience perceptions of credibility, partisanship, and journalistic professionalism, providing empirical data on how political parallelism affects public trust.

An extensive survey, broken down into six major sections, has been conducted for this research project. The survey collected information about demographics, news and media consumption habits, perception of political bias and misinformation, misinformation and source evaluation, trust in media and news credibility, and engagement with political news and public discourse.

3.2 Semi-structured interviews

Semi-structured interviews with journalists, editors, media owners, and political communication operatives complement the findings from the survey by providing insider perspectives on the structural and economic realities that shape editorial policies and reporting practices. Interviews help to uncover the less visible dynamics, such as pressures from political patrons, self-censorship, or informal alliances, that cannot be captured through survey questions and content analysis alone.

For this research project, three one-hour interviews were conducted with the former President’s Office of the Maldives spokesperson, the Editor in Chief of Adhadhu News, and a senior journalist from Dhauru News. In a small and close-knit media ecosystem like the Maldives, where personalist networks often influence media behaviour, qualitative interviews are indispensable for contextualising the observed patterns of political parallelism. However, due to this research project’s limited word count and scope, this report will focus solely on the survey findings.

Textual and discourse analysis

Textual and discourse analysis will be essential for unpacking how political parallelism manifests in media outputs. Analysing news articles, editorials, and social media content from major Maldivian outlets and influential digital accounts makes it possible to trace patterns of political alignment, rhetorical strategies, and ideological framing. Discourse analysis will allow the study to capture what is reported and how it is reported, revealing implicit biases, narrative structures, and the subtle reinforcement of political identities.

Given the Maldives’ hybrid media traits and history of clientelistic ties between media and political actors, this method is crucial to understanding how language becomes a tool of political advocacy and agenda-setting. However, due to the limited scope of this research project, the research will primarily focus on the findings from the survey and interviews.

By triangulating findings from these three methodologies, the research can comprehensively map how political parallelism shapes ownership structures, editorial policies, and journalistic practices while evaluating its broader consequences on media credibility and democratic trust. This integrated approach is vital for a nuanced understanding of a rapidly evolving and politically charged media landscape like the Maldives.

Findings

Survey Findings

139 respondents attempted the survey, of which 103 completed it. Of the 103 respondents, 97 were recorded as true, and six were recorded as false for not meeting the criteria of being a Maldivian National and declining consent for the survey.

Demographic Information

From the 97 completed responses, 56% are male, 41% are female, and 3% who have responded prefer not to say their gender. The survey has been completed by a wide range of age groups, with the highest percentages being 20-24 (29%), 25-29 (24%), 16-19, and 30-34 (14%). 76% of the respondents who completed the survey have reported to currently reside in the Greater Male’ Region of Maldives (the capital), which consists of Male’, Hulhumale’, and Villigilli, 21% residing abroad, and 3% living outside of the capital.

Educational attainment was high, with 25% holding a bachelor’s degree, 14% an honours degree, and 11% a taught master’s; 7% each had completed secondary school or a diploma, and small minorities held postgraduate research, foundation, or doctoral qualifications. Employment sectors varied: 30% were students, 22% worked in the private sector, 18% in public enterprises, 13% in civil service, 10% were unemployed, 6% self-employed, and 2% identified as ‘other’.

Digital connectivity was nearly universal: 81% reported being “always connected” and 19% “multiple times a day.” Self-assessed digital literacy was high, 78% were “very confident” and 17% were “somewhat confident” in using online platforms.

News Habits and Media Consumption

Smartphones dominated, with 98 respondents (95%) using them to access news. Laptops/desktops were next at 32%, followed by television sets at 16% and tablets at 9%. Daily news consumption varied: 34% spent less than an hour, 26% one to two hours, 21% two to four hours, 22% four to six hours, and 20% more than six hours.

Television remained the primary traditional source for 60% of respondents. Notably, 35% reported rarely or never using traditional outlets. The leading local channels were Television Maldives (58 respondents) and Raajje TV (54), with other stations playing much smaller roles.

For social media usage for news consumption, Instagram led by (77%), followed by X/Twitter (65%), and News Apps (66%) in “frequent” usage, with Facebook (35%), YouTube (40%), and TikTok (58%). For the single “top” digital source, Instagram was the main (34%), followed by X (22%) and messaging apps like WhatsApp/Viber (20%). However, when breaking news occurs, 51% turn first to X, 20% to news websites, and only 5% to television.

Perception of Political Bias and Misinformation

A combined 89% agreed (26%) or strongly agreed (63%) that Maldivian outlets display political bias. 67% observed “very frequent” overt bias and 27% noted it as “often,” with only 6% seeing it “sometimes” or less.

Story selection and framing were identified by 81 respondents as the clearest signs of bias, followed by headlines (76), language and tone (60), images and videos (37), and timing of coverage (21). Regarding whether the media serve party interests, 61 respondents “strongly agreed” and 26 “agreed,” with a small dissenting minority.

Only 3% believed outlets provide balanced perspectives, with ‘probably’ or ‘definitely’ (2% and 1%, respectively). Conversely, 80% said coverage is “definitely not’ (48%) or “probably not’ (32%) balanced.

Misinformation and Source Evaluation

Approximately 58% encounter false or misleading content “very frequently" (23%) or “often" (35%), and another 32% “sometimes,” leaving only 9% who see it “rarely” or never. Conflicting coverage of the same event was similarly common: 64% reported “very frequent" (28%) or “often" (36%) divergence across outlets. 31% admitted to sharing false stories unknowingly, while 41% said they hadn't, and 28% were unsure. When detecting false content, 37 respondents cited “comments or criticism,” 34 “own research,” 31 “comparison with other sources,” 27 “fact-checking services,” and 10 “corrections by outlets.”

Sensational headlines (70), factual inconsistencies (69), and lack of named sources (61) were the main reasons to doubt credibility; poor grammar/spelling and overt bias tone also featured prominently. Politically biased reporting (82 respondents), misleading headlines (71), and out-of-context images/videos (65) topped concerns, ahead of religious/ethnic (51), economic (40), and health misinformation (30). 92% believed misinformation has a “definite' (73%) or “probable” (19%) impact on public opinion; none saw any effect.

Trust in Media and News Credibility

Only 30% regarded their preferred sources as offering “definitely” (8%) or “probably” (22%) balanced coverage; 24% were unsure, and 24% thought “probably not” or “definitely not” balanced.

Over three-quarters expressed high anxiety about misinformation influencing elections, 52% “very concerned” and 27% “concerned.” 94% felt misinformation contributes a "great deal" (63%) or “a lot" (31%) to social and political division.

Only 10% of TV channels were rated as “very credible” or “credible” combined (2% and 8%); 65% considered them “not very” or “not credible at all’. A majority (68%) believed TV tends to sensationalise issues (32% “definitely yes,’ 36% “probably yes’).

Engagement with Political News and Public Discourse

While 58% said the credibility of the source mattered most, 33% viewed likes/shares as “not at all important” for trust, although 25% rated them as “slightly” or “moderately” necessary. Only 6% ‘often’ corrected others; 22% did so “occasionally,’ 18% “rarely,” and 16% ‘never.’

While 27% ‘always” or “often” sought ideologically similar news, 51% “sometimes” did so; 17% ‘always” and 34% “often” sought alternative viewpoints before forming opinions. 52% had altered their political views, with 20% doing so ‘multiple times” and 20% ‘once or twice' after reading news.

A clear majority (84%) believed political bias has grown over the past five years, 64% “significantly” and 20% “slightly”.

Discussion and Analysis

The survey data show that Maldivian audiences are highly aware of the partisan backgrounds of their media outlets. When asked to match television and online news platforms to political parties, respondents linked Raajje TV with the Maldivian Democratic Party (90.4%), PSM/TVM with the People’s National Congress (73.4%), VTV with the Jumhooree Party (80.2%), and Channel 13 with the People’s National Front (77.2%). Even among digital-only outlets, such as Raaje.mv (53.4% MDP) and Adhadhu News (39.3% MDP), majorities clearly perceived political connections. In contrast, fewer than 13% believed any outlet was completely non-partisan. This strong awareness of ownership and funding affiliations highlights the deep level of structural alignment in the Maldivian media system. According to Hallin and Mancini’s terms, political actors have incorporated their agendas directly into media institutions, making content an extension of factional support rather than objective reporting.

Beyond formal ownership, audiences identify various ways political actors influence editorial content. A total of 85 respondents highlighted “media ownership by politically affiliated individuals,” 72 mentioned “sponsorships and funding,” and 71 reported “political pressure or influence” as key control channels. Informal networks also play a significant role, with 67 noting “unofficial ties between journalists and political figures,” 52 pinpointing “editorial appointments influenced by politics,” and 40 recognising “self‐censorship by journalists.” Additionally, 68% of the sample “definitely” and 24% “probably” believe that political figures exercise some form of sway over editorial content. These findings depict the media as a clientelistic arena, where political patrons use economic and relational power to shape news agendas.

This structural and procedural parallelism is clearly visible in news coverage itself. Fully 94% of respondents report noticing obvious bias toward specific parties or figures either “very frequently” (67%) or “often” (27%). When asked which features most clearly reveal bias, 81 respondents pointed to story selection and framing, 76 to sensational headlines, 60 to emotive language and tone, and 37 to the use of images or video. In tandem, the survey’s misinformation module found that 82 respondents cited “politically biased reporting” as a major concern, with 71 highlighting “misleading headlines” and 65 noting “fabricated news stories” as especially problematic. This convergence of structural ownership, influence tactics, and content-level cues confirms that political parallelism in the Maldives operates not only behind the scenes but also in every headline and frame.

As a result of these complex dynamics, public perceptions of balance and credibility are significantly reduced. Only 3% of respondents believe that Maldivian media outlets provide balanced coverage across political perspectives; 48% say “definitely not” and 32% “probably not”. Similarly, when asked if their preferred news sources offer impartial reporting, just 8% responded “definitely yes” and 22% “probably yes,” while 21% answered “probably not” and 3% “definitely not”. 63% “strongly agree” and 26% “agree” that most domestic media are politically biased. These perceptions create a substantial trust deficit: only 10% consider television channels “credible,” while 65% regard them as “not credible” or worse. When media are broadly seen as factional platforms, their ability to inform and involve the public in democratic debate is severely hampered.

Misinformation damages this trust crisis. More than half of survey respondents often see false or misleading content, 23% “very frequently,” 35% “often,” and 32% “sometimes.” Conflicting reports on the same event are described as “very frequently” by 28% and “often” by 36%, creating an environment where no single narrative can be fully trusted. People understand the real-world impact of this issue: 92% believe misinformation has a “definite” (73%) or “probable” (19%) effect on public opinion, and 94% say it increases social and political division. Yet only a small part, 6%, “often” correct misinformation they see, and 41% never join online political discussions. This gap between recognising the problem and taking action shows widespread helplessness, which deepens cynicism and disengagement.

Digital platforms, particularly X (formerly Twitter), magnify these parallelism dynamics. When breaking news occurs, 51 respondents turn first to X, compared with 20 to dedicated news websites and only 5 to television. Social‐media usage for news is similarly skewed: 65 % “frequently” use X, alongside 77 % on Instagram and 58 % on TikTok. Advocacy journalism is rapidly broadcast to large audiences in a media ecosystem where algorithms privilege sensational, partisan content, crowding out more nuanced reporting. As Lee, Lin, and Chen (2024) observe in East Asian contexts, such digital advocacy journalism intensifies the feedback loop between politicians and sympathetic outlets, reinforcing agenda‐setting patterns first identified by Van der Pas, van der Brug, and Vliegenthart (2017).

Conclusion

Taken together, the quantitative and qualitative evidence confirms a self‐reinforcing cycle: partisan ownership establishes institutional bias; editorial controls channel political interests into coverage; digital platforms amplify sensational content; and audiences internalise these messages as proof of media unworthiness. The result is a deeply polarised public sphere where trust in information reaches a low point, civic engagement declines, and democratic deliberation is at risk.

Addressing these challenges requires a multifaceted approach. First, statutory mandates for transparency in media ownership and funding could reveal hidden affiliations and help audiences understand coverage better. Second, the independence of newsrooms must be strengthened through editorial charters, ombudsperson offices, and strong journalistic codes of ethics that penalise undue political interference. Third, media-literacy programs designed for digital natives can equip citizens with the skills to spot bias, verify sources, and carry out constructive fact-checking. Lastly, regulators and civil society groups should consider platform accountability measures, such as promoting algorithmic transparency, to reduce the rapid spread of partisan misinformation.

In summary, the Maldivian case clearly demonstrates how political parallelism, if left unchecked, alters media institutions and discourses in ways that undermine public trust. Reversing these trends requires both structural reforms and citizen-focused actions, based on the understanding that a healthy media environment is crucial for democratic resilience.